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Two complaints keep recurring in the skeptical responses which continue to greet
economists and economic historians, myself included, who maintain that the
phenomenon of path dependence and its connection with the likelihood of market
failure deserve to be taken seriously.
1 One refrain is the dismissal of economic
theorems (“blackboard economics”) as lacking relevance to the “real” issues.  The other
is the demand that a demonstration of major quantitative importance (“oomph”) should
accompany any case study that claims to have identified a situation in which market
processes failed to yield other than the best of the available alternative allocations of
resources.
These two lines of criticism raise some substantively interesting methodological
problems that merit closer scrutiny.
2  They turn out to be interrelated, rather than
independent questions, and are connected to the important issues of the role of
counterfactuals and the distribution of the burden of emprical proof in applied
microeconomics. On more careful consideration, however, it will  be seen that neither
critique can sustain the dogged skepticism regarding  historical economics that has
expressed itself in attacks upon “path dependence” and “the economics of QWERTY.”
To the lighthouse? : on historical critiques as surrogates for theoretical arguments
Let’s begin with the disdain that Deirdre McCloskey expresses for the resort to
theory -- “blackboard economics” -- in the rebuttal I offered to the arguments presented
by  “The Myth of QWERTY,” the feature story that Clive Crook, deputy editor of  The
Economist (02.04.1999), wrote about Stan Liebowitz and Stephen Margolis’s (then)
forthcoming book.
3  Surely a little bit of welfare theory about the economics of public
goods hardly comes amiss in that context. Liebowitz and Margolis have draw a parallel
between their dismissal of QWERTY as “a myth,” and Ronald Coase’s critique of
                                                                
1  Both those motifs of dissatisfaction run through the text of Deirdre McCloskey’s E-mail exchange on
the subject with Bradford DeLong (see, e.g., D.N.McCloskey’s ’s reply to DeLong, on EH.NET: 28 June
1999). These lines of criticism should be distinguished from the more sweeping, and more technically
mis-informed dismissal of the idea of path dependence, such as that which recently has found its way
into  The Economist (“Economic Focus” for 3 April, 1999, and 18 September 1999).
2 This cannot be said of the gratuitously argumentative mis-characterizations of the facts concerning the
economic history of typewriter keyboards, video cassette recorder formats and other network
technologies, which are repeated by the fringe of economists who have reacted vigorously against the
concept of path dependence. The source of most of these distortions is the publications of Stan J.
Liebowitz and Stephen E. Margolis, now conveniently collected in a book: Winners, Losers & Microsoft:
Competition and Antitrust in High Technology, Oakland, CA.: The Independent Institute, 1999, Chs. 2,
3, 6 especially.
3 The full text was posted on <eh.res@eh.net>, the economic history bulletin board of the Cliometric
Society, on  14 April 1999, and an abridged version appeared as a Letter in The Economist, 24 April
1999.Samuelson’s concept of pure public goods by questioning the historical validity of
citing lighthouse services as the example of a pure public good.  To critique a
theoretical concept, one first has to understand it on its own terms.
Moreover, as a practical matter, to clarify the meaning of key analytical
concepts such as “market failure” or “public goods,” and to explain their relevance for
understanding the evolution of technology in a market economy,  surely are among the
things that academic economists and economic historians ought to feel obliged to do.
Isn’t it an especially worthwhile undertaking where one sees such terms being distorted
in the public media, largely for rhetorical effect in advancing a particular ideological
position?  If there are good arguments for free market regimes and capitalism, why let
them be driven out by bad arguments?
Quite apart from the evident public purpose that may be served by “blackboard
economics,” I was quite amazed to find myself chided from this particular quarter for
reviewing some points of basic theory in an exposition for a lay audience.  Rushing to
the blackboard for just such purposes (even at academic economics conferences) used
to a famous “D. N. McCloskey specialty”; I wasn’t aware that it has now become
“incorrect.”  What a pity that it should be, I thought, because I really rather enjoy the
occasional “chalk-up.”  Call it an occupational addiction, if you will, but it’s really
more than a personal indulgence.  Language, as well as history (and most language is
history) “matters”.  That’s something that students of academic “rhetoric” -- especially
McCloskey -- also spent a lot of time trying to teach the economics profession.  So,
linguistic precision matters: one ought not casually discard the meaning given to terms
such as market failure,” or the formal propositions associated with that concept.
McCloskey’s main point, however, is that basic theory really can’t take us very
far because its conclusions generally are qualitative.  This leads, in turn, to a call for
quantitative demonstration of the “significance” of  departures from optimalilty under
“free market” resource allocation regimes.  This seems quite reasonable, or at least it
could be formulated in a reasonable way.  In any case it is a refrain that often is
repeated in response to unwelcome arguments: “Yes, but does that really matter?”
Consider the following passage, from McCloskey’s warm but persistingly skeptical
response (posted on EH.NET, 28 April 1999) to my essay “QWERTY and the
Economics of the Millennium Bug”:
I don't imagine that your case can be refuted with a snap of fingers. You
were the pioneer of such arguments, which in theoretical work by Romer
and so forth have become so important, and we are proud that it was an
economic historian (of course).  You were a pioneer against opposition,
too, from people like me, who kept saying, "Forget about Allyn Young."
  But the scientific question is one of oomph, isn't it?  I think you agree
that "existence" (that math-department word so foreign to an empirical
science like physics or history) of economies of scale and the like is not
sufficient for any scientific conclusion about how big such effects are.
None.
So: On the reaper we sceptics are still waiting for a believable factual
showing that the sharing of machines was expensive enough that
unimproved acreage was a constraint.  It's a matter of oomph.  Likewiseon QWERTY we sceptics are still waiting for a showing of why, say, an
insurance company with 3000 typists has not yet found it profitable to
adopt a "better" keyboard.
Likewise on the 2000 bug (though for all my scepticism you won't find
ME on an airplane January 31-Jan. 1!!) we request a showing that such
economies-of-scale-and-irreversibilities are big factors in the world
economy when set beside the constant-returns effects of adopting
modern education, say, or dropping the jailing of intellectuals.  You will
say, "But look: $300 billion."  To which I say, always, what's the scale
for significance?  Worldwide that's a small effect.  Not trivial: I'd gladly
accept a tiny share of it as my personal income; it will be discernable I
imagine in the annual figures of economic growth. But how does it
compare with the gains from India, say, adopting American ways of
doing things from education to electronics, which she will in the next 50
years?  THAT difference is 100s of percentages of present Indian GNP
per capita. Beside which 1, 2% for this or that dead-end? . . .  Not much
oomph?
I suppose this is what soon might catch on as “the new economics of oomph.”
Unfortunately, despite the many occasions on which the term is invoked, “oomph”
itself still has yet to be clearly defined, much less subjected to measurement.
(Although clearly the concept refers to some cardinal magnitude -- since it is something
that we don’t seem to have “enough” of  -- even the appropriate unit of measurement
remains unspecified.  It is, perhaps,  the  “oompha”?)  From the context, however, one
may surmise that this innovation in quantitative rhetoric is a suggested calibration of
the persuasive force of an argument.  Who, then, is to say whether the level of
oompha’s are enough, the most skeptical member of the audience?
Thus, the $300 billion that I cited as likely to be spent on fixing the millennium
bug still is held by McCloskey to be "small" on the global scale of things, which is
where we are told the significance of  this particular “free market mistake” ought to be
evaluated.  Well, $300 billion is about equal to the total value of foreign direct
investment in emerging markets during the past decade.  So, perhaps by the reflexive
argument, the latter also is too small to “matter” much?  As an object of policy, as a
focus of economic analysis, as a factor that has altered the lives of the people in those
economies, should we agree that those foreign direct investment flows are "not
significant" enough for us to bother with?
Rather, it would better to pause to consider that there is nothing positive that we
mere mortals can affect in the span of a generation, whether individually or
collectively, that would be "significant" by the flexible standard of “persuasion” that
McCloskey appears to have adopted? (I’ve put the qualifier "positive" into the
preceding sentence in order to take care of the option of blowing up the planet.  But
then, in the scale of the galaxy, what's a planet --even if it does happened to be ours?)
This suggests that the one thing that makes its worth having an ideé fixe -- such as the
belief that path dependence cannot be important in economics -- is the security of
knowing that there is no fact or theorem that would ever be big enough (measured in
oomphs or oompha’s)  to dent or dislodge it from your mind. I suppose that is the
comfort of religious and other dogmas.“Oompha-metrics” and economic theory: substitutes or complements?
A more subtle point worth bringing out is the clever asymmetry of McCloskey’s
argument, from whence proceeds not only the view of the triviality of all the illustrative
instances of the workings of the economics of QWERTY, but also the rhetorical force
with which the QWERTY-skeptics attack such research as being “scientifically”
inadequate, “urban myths” and “bogus anecdotes.”   We first are asked to acknowledge
that “theory” is not decisive.  Economic  measurements of benefits and costs are
required,  too.  Fine. Who could disagree?  But the claim,  in effect, is that to be
“scientific” we must be able to calculate the welfare magnitude of the losses entailed by
deviations from the unique and globally stable efficient path, as if the latter was
something existing objectively in the material world, something that you can see. So,
although this is not explicitly acknowledged, it turns out here that measurement
requires a good bit of theory.  This truth holds for “oompha-metrics” as much as in
econometrics.
How could you fix the reference point for the foregoing calculation, unless the
theorems held?  In most interesting instances of applied analysis, the Pareto efficiency
locus -- and its dynamical counterpart -- remains a counterfactual idealization, at best.
To establish such a benchmark empirically requires some kind of simulation, as
McCloskey has recognized.  More precisely, a counterfactual simulation is what is
required. Yet, the problems of parameterizing a complete counterfactual model using
data from the world of actuality are well known.  Consequently,  the methodological
burden being pressed upon the applied economist by the QWERTY-skeptics  is a pretty
heavy one indeed.
It  doesn’t seem unfair to point out  that the economic analysis that is said, on
the one hand, to be  able only to take us “so far,” is the very same body of theory that
he QWERTY-skeptics are using, with the other hand,  to get as far as the presumption
that “we” (or they at least)  have a pretty good idea of what the economy’s optimum
path looks like.  How do they manage that trick?  Largely by smoke and mirrors, alas:
asserting  that we should know that under the value system inculcated by capitalism, or
“bourgeois culture” -- which Marxists used to associate with capitalism, and Hayekians
associated with the workings of “free markets” -- we must end up in the near
neighborhood of some sort of welfare optimum optimorum.  There is a key double-
elision in this claim, neither part of which is strictly legitimate.
The first elision is the association of the individual behavioral predispositions
formed by  “bourgeois culture” with the existence of the very stringent conditions of a
competitive market economy conditions that would transmute private vice into public
virtue -- as envisaged by the first and second theorems of welfare economics. The
second slight-of-hand is the quiet shift  from establishing conditions under which $100
bills will not be left lying on the pavement (static welfare efficiency),  to the assertion
that these will guarantee the emergence of economic dynamism and long-run
improvements of the lot of the masses in a society such as India’s.
Notice, further, that it simply will not do to try countering this criticism with the
argument: “Well, if we were far below the optimum, there would be am economic
surplus to be had by moving to the superior equilibrium, and that would be a sufficient
spur to individual (private) remedial action.”  The latter is the line of argumentationwhich confuses what is privately profitable for economic agents acting in an
historically given context, with the course of action for the social ensemble whose
interactions will create the historical path of development. It is related to the circular
logic of McCloskey’s proposed “test” of QWERTY’s alleged near optimality -- observe
whether or not a firm that today is employing 3000 typists would or would not install
Dvorak computer keyboards.  But the latter is tantamount to saying that market failure
cannot happen, because if it did happen, markets would work to correct it.  McCloskey
is not alone in this style of reasoning.  One can  read patently circular arguments of that
kind elsewhere, notably in the critiques of QWERTY by Stan Liebowitz and Steve
Margolis, and other contributors to the backlash against path dependence  But this
doesn’t require economists -- or anyone else -- to take such arguments seriously.
“Oompha-metrics” and the burden of proof
  But let me press on further,  by asking these QWERTY-skeptics by what logic
the burden of empirical proof has to be distributed in the way they propose?  Those
who would contest the Panglossian presumption about the workings of markets under
capitalism are being called upon  to step up to the task of showing that departures from
the theoretical optimum really matter “a lot.”  Why isn’t it up to the skeptics to
demonstrate empirically that they only matter “a little”?  Where is it written that the
burden of showing quantitative importance in this matter belongs only on the shoulders
of  those who keep finding grounds (in both  reason and fact) for disputing the
presumption of optimality or near optimality?
 This issue is  distinct from the problem that in gauging what was or was not an
economically “important” or “significant” effect depends upon the kind of dynamic
model one has in mind.  In some dynamical systems differences at the margin remain
“marginal.”  But  in others, and especially in non-linear and complex systems having a
multiplicity of  attractors,  what looks to be a  “small” effects at the margin in a static
evaluation readily can ramify and cumulate into far-reaching transformations of the
system’s emergent properties.  In other words, the details of the simulation model, like
the details of history, will matter to the outcomes.  Here, however,  I am putting all that
aside in order to focus on the simple question of who it is that needs to describe the
shape of the implicit counterfactual(s) optima, once we accept that there is no
theoretical basis for the presumption that the present situation coincides with a unique
optimum optimorum or is even a close, second-best optimum.
 The position staked out by the QWERTY-skeptics seems to be that the gap
between “what is” and “what ought to be” in terms of efficiency ought to be viewed to
be negligibly small until it is proven otherwise. Were that argument sound, it would
certainly support McCloskey’s proposed assignment of the burden of empirical proof.
But, it is not sound.  Even supposing that “small” was well defined -- a matter of some
doubt, as I have already suggested -- what is the basis for that pre-supposition?  Have
the skeptics managed to carry out the required counterfactual simulation? More to the
point, isn’t it  methodologically incumbent upon those who hold to that side of the
“conversation”  to be making another trip to the black board?
The position they have staked out calls for them to have first identified the
relevant conditions for both the optimum optimorum in the specific context,  and some
relevant “second best” optima besides.  Only then could would it be relevant to producethe evidence that the second best conditions were fulfilled.  And, after having done all
that, the skeptics would be obliged to show  -- without any arbitrary linearizations --
that the actual situation corresponds to one among the “second best” outcomes that in
some welfare sense is “close to” the first best.  Obviously, this is not what the critics of
path dependence and the dedicated QWERTY-skeptics have sought to do.
 Little wonder, for it really is a formidable challenge.  Pending some signs of
such activity, I remain persuaded that the more fruitful course for micro-level historical
case studies will not involve the construction of extended counterfactual models
required for quantitative exercises of that sort.  Rather, there is much to be learned from
continuing to work on more modest, and correspondingly more feasible programs of
research into how history matters.  One way to do so is to seek to identify critical
branch points in the stream of technological and institutional evolution.  To make the
case for path dependence in its canonical form, it is sufficient to show two things about
such junctures. The first is that there existed a multiplicity of feasible paths forward,
and that these were both distinctive and locally stable in some well-defined sense -- that
the agents choosing one or another path would not have been likely (soon) to be led
back to a single, globally stable attractor of the kind that characterizes a ergodic
dynamical system.
The second requisite concerns the process of “selection”at the branch point(s):t
he actual path of development must be shown to be an emergent system property whose
“selection” was an unintended consequence of the interactions among agents that were
not engaged in any conscious collective choice. Alternatively,  if it happens that one
can establish a deliberate, purposive action to have been the decisive mechanism of
selection,  then the dominant actor’s behavior should be seen to have been guided by
considerations (economically rational or otherwise) that did not give significant weight
to potential entailed consequences that happen to be of interest from our present
vantage point. That is what is what should be understood by references in the literature
on path dependence the role of “historical accident”; it is not that such selecting events
or actions were irrational, or inexplicable, or even unpredictable -- simply that they
proceeded from causal factors that were orthogonal to the system level economic issues
that we, as ex post analysts, can see were at stake.
To go further than that, and thus to enter into the specific domain of
“QWERTY-nomics,” calls for something more.  One must show that the economic
conditions of positive feedback which gave rise to the existence of that multiplicity of
locally stable paths, were such as would deprive a decentralized, competitive price
system of the ability automatically to guide the actors in the most socially efficient
direction.  In other words, where the source of non-ergodicity in the system happens
also  to be one of the large class of (convexity-destroying) conditions that undermine
attainment of Pareto efficiency in a competitive market regime, market failure becomes
a likely outcome.
A path dependent historical account of any richness and complexity will not
consist of only one such branch point, but of a succession of critical junctures.  This
calls for careful examination of the conditions that over time acted  to both generate
and delimit the array of available choices, as well as the succession of selection
mechanisms. The idealization of a path dependent historical process as one in which the
economic system passes through only one critical juncture or branch point, from whichit emerges “locked in” to a particular dynamical equilibrium, is just that: an
idealization. Its purpose is not the  faithfully realistic historical explanation of most of
the history of the world in which we live, but, instead, a idealized heuristic, meant to
explain the approach to historical explanation.
The fact that the layout of typewriter keyboards, like the gauge of railways in
many parts of the world, happened to have stabilized a long time ago, and that the
technological systems in which these are embedded are still around, makes these
illustrative cases heuristically useful rather than proto-typical. In reality, the structures
defining locally stable attractors are subject to a higher frequency of disruptions. Such
disturbing impulses can arise endogenously, albeit as low probability events; but others
enter the economic sphere (narrowly conceived) from other, inter-penetrating of
domains that have their own characteristic dynamics -- generating events in the
cultural, political and physical environments.
For me the story of the evolution of the QWERTY keyboard format continues
to be an instructive and empirically sound heuristic, exhibiting a constellation of
generic features to which many episodes in technological and institutional history
conform.  Accordingly,  I have tried on this occasion to articulate the generic elements
of the story that bear upon an economic assessment of this technology’s evolutionary
course of development, and to place the burden of empirical proof where it properly
should lay.  This has yielded a challenging and constructive program of research for
QWERTY-skeptics to undertake -- supposing, of course, that they really wanted to give
their implicitly theoretical presuppositions about the efficient workings of markets
some empirical “oomph.”
Neoclassical skepticism and the QWERTY keyboard: is there a cure for repetitive
thought injury?
Do I expect the doubters to quickly sign up to pursue the proposed course of
inquiry? Alas, I must say that I do not.  The evidence of past performance suggests that
the deeper roots of QWERTY-skepticism lie in pre-commitments to  laissez-faire
economic ideology rather than to the advancement of economic knowledge.  As for
Professors Liebowitz and Margolis, and other truly dedicated QWERTY-skeptics,  I
expect they simply will go on insisting that nothing but  “the best” technology -- and,
for that matter, the best organizations, and the best non-governmental institutions --
could survive in market competition.  Worse yet, for that (un-) reason, they most
probably will go on dismissing the concept of path dependence as devoid of any useful
insights into economically important phenomena or the formulation of micro-economic
policies for a dyamic world..
Unfortunately, the amount of attention which has been devoted to the pros and
cons of  this one, particular illustrative case of path dependent technological evolution
seems already to be excessive.  Certainly, the haggling over QWERTY until now has
not contributed notably to the formulation of the program of research into the
economics of path dependence and its implications.   Indeed,  in my view, the obsessive
character of QWERTY-skepticism itself threatens to distract attention from the more
general class of theoretical questions and empirical phenomena for which QWERTY
was intended to be only a readily comprehensible symbol.To be sure, there is (by design) considerable rhetorical force in this illustration.
That must bear some of the responsibility for fact that so many economists continue to
be hung up on the question of whether or not QWERTY is the best keyboard available
today; and, if it isn’t, whether that entails a “big” economic inefficiency,  or one the
should be dismissed as inconsequentially small.  For scholars seriously interested in the
historical development of typewriting technology this could be a reasonable obsession.
But, to suppose that it is substantively crucial to any of the interesting issues surround
path dependence and its economic policy implications is just plain silly.
As this was not a direction in which I felt it would be particularly useful to
encourage others to invest their time, it seemed best to decline invitations to become
engaged in debates with the die-hard skeptics whose attacks on the concept of path
dependence were formulated as disputations of the historical evidence regarding the
story of QWERTY.  My reading of those arguments was, and still is that their core
reflects nothing so much as complete a failure to grasp the analytical points that the
story of QWERTY was supposed to illustrate.  Indeed, focusing so much attention on
the efficiency aspect of this particular case, as if the relevance for economics of the
whole subject of multiple equilibria in stochastic processes (and the mechanisms
whereby “selection” occurs among them) somehow turned upon the answer to it, strikes
me as wrong-headed on at least four separate counts.  Perhaps, even at the risk of
further stoking the fires of unproductive controvsey, it will be best now to say why, as
plainly as I can.
The first count on which QWERTY-skepticism has erred follows from the fact
that you can have multiple equilibria that aren’t uniquely Pareto-ranked, as well as path
dependence in dynamical systems that attain one or another among the multiplicity of
Paret-efficient equilibria.  That means that the question of what is and is not
“inefficient” is quite separable from the question of the usefulness of the conceptual
framework of path dependence, considered as an approach alternative to the
neoclassical paradigm of  ahistorical economics.  For economists to accept the
contention that path dependence only matters if it is accompanied by market failures
would be to cast aside as uninteresting, and hence not worthy of explanatory attention,
myriad features of the organization of economic activity, along with numerous issues of
long-term economic growth, distribution, and inter-generational equity that lie beyond
the narrow purview of well-defined issues concerning allocative efficiency.
Secondly, as I have argued in the foregoing, it is difficult to  see any
justification for accepting the burden of proving empirically that the outcome of a
competitive market process has been other than efficient, given that you have
established empirically that the case under examination is one in which the source of
the positive feedback in the system is the presence of positive (network) externalities,
or non-convexities such as learning effects and habituation.  The theoretical
presumption that the market would select the most efficient option among the available
alternatives no longer exists under those conditions. This isn’t news; it’s old hat in
welfare economics.  So, then, the burden of proof plainly falls on those who say that
everything has turned out for the best; that QWERTY is better—in terms of social
efficiency criteria -- than anything that was and is available.   They ought to
substantiate that claim, and maybe explain whether that was just a stroke of good luckor whether something far deeper, something economic theory hasn’t recognized about
the workings of markets, was going on.
Thirdly, QWERTY’s story is hardly the only path dependent tale in which it has
been suggested that some outcome -- other than the one that people in the past lived, or
with which we are still living -- wasn’t  “best in the best of all possible worlds.”  Why
obsess on this single, manifestly minor illustration?  Why not look at the stories of light
water nuclear reactors (a “sub”-optimal technology if there ever was one!); or pesticide-
and herbicide-intensive agriculture; or at the whole bevy of information technologies
that managed to become industry standards by displacing alternatives whose adoption
certainly would not have been worse, and arguably would have been more
advantageous for society?
Fourthly, empirical demonstrations in such cases, either way, aren’t really so
simple as has been suggested by those who focus on assessments of QWERTY today.
Indeed, such assessments never will be easy to carry through properly when
technologies and institutions have evolved along  path dependent trajectories.  The
notion of identifying the question of efficiency with the evaluation of just the currently
observed state can’t does much sense in such circumstances. You also have to consider,
in the case of the QWERTY keyboard, to take one good illustration, the question of the
comparative ergonomic properties of the alternative keyboard layouts that were
implemented on manual typewriters, and on machines of different vintages. Mitigation
of the costs of market failures does not erase them if amelioration itself carries costs,
and thus it will only be under special circumstances that one can hope to assess the
resource costs of such “mistakes” by looking only at the most recent, or terminal part of
the path.
Thus, for those who succumb to the sirens of cliometrics, and undertake
quantitative research in the economics of QWERTY,  it may be necessary  to gauge
inefficiencies in terms of the path-integral of the costs of what I’ve called “path-
constrained melioration.” That’s a fancy terms for the process through which
modifications are made in a technology, or an institution, in order to mitigate the costs
of its dysfunctional properties.  One can see the resource cost dimensions of this
process very plainly in the case of the millennium bug, because the nature of the
coordination failure there was that the decentralized market incentives led firms to
delay attending to the problem for as long as possible, so that the costs piled up at the
end in a very visible fashion.
If you accept the dysfunctional characteristics of a technological system, or of
an institution, as part of the status quo, then you look at the costs of remediation as an
investment proposition.  Either it is or is not worth making: more frequently than not it
looks better to  throw more money at the problem than it would be to start again from
scratch, which is why tens of billions of dollars have been spent in “fixing” legacy
system computer software.  But why set up an accounting system that at each point
accepts the status quo as having been unavoidable? Shouldn’t one instead gauge the
costs of the problems we have been handed to fix as a consequence of the poor
selections made in the past?
 When the economics profession eventually comes to take path dependence
seriously and pursue research of that sort, so that more can be learned about the
dynamics of path-constrained melioration costs, we will be better equipped to figureout how to avoid, or mitigate future costly burdens that doubtless are being created
now, and with which future generations will have to cope.  It does not take great
imagination to see that this path for research would lead the discipline towards a more
serious engagement with the economics of environmental sustainability.  The question
is how much longer the world can affort to  wait while economists get their collective
intellectual act together: “If not now, when?”REFERENCES
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